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Democracy and Effectiveness: Adapting
Intelligence for the Fight Against Terrorism
Several countries in South America have recently undertaken reforms of their
intelligence systems, and other countries in the region are now beginning
similar reforms. While in most cases the initial motivation was to bring the
intelligence agencies under democratic civil control as one of the last
phases of democratic consolidation, civilian governments and military
leaders are today increasingly motivated to reform their intelligence
systems in order to better respond to threats from organized crime and
terrorism.
SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND APPROACH
TO AN OPAQUE TOPIC
Since 1994 the Center for Civil–Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, has been developing and
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delivering seminars in the United States and abroad on all aspects of
democratic civil–military relations. Beginning in Argentina in 1998,
CCMR included the reform of intelligence agencies within the scope of
civil–military relations. The topic is now included as part of its annual
seminars in Romania, resident seminars in Monterey, as well as seminars
in Colombia and modules of seminars in several countries in Asia and
Latin America. CCMR instructors have also been invited to participate
in workshops and conferences on intelligence issues in Brazil, Chile,
Mongolia, and the United States. Through academic studies, and, even
more importantly, close contact with intelligence professionals and those
responsible for the tasking and oversight of intelligence organizations in
the countries where CCMR delivers programs, instructors have learned
quite a lot in areas where credible information and scholarly literature
are limited. Several CCMR faculty members hold security clearances and
a few are retired intelligence professionals.
Beginning in 2002 the CCMR developed, and currently delivers, seminars
in the United States and abroad on the topic of fighting terrorism in a
democracy. Close contact with civilians and military officers, police, and
intelligence professionals responsible for formulating and implementing
policy to counter terrorism has offered insights to CCMR instructors on
the challenges inherent in preventing terrorist attacks while at the same
time preserving democratic institutions and practices. These are obviously
complicated issues.
Of all CCMR topics, undoubtedly the most complex area is the utilization
of intelligence in fighting terrorism. While each topic—intelligence and
fighting terrorism—is very complex in itself, combining them results in
geometrically increased complications. Yet, the complications must be
confronted and clarified, as intelligence holds the key in preventing
terrorist attacks and dismantling terrorist cells. The sources of information,
or the data, are what we have learned from the questions and comments of
the participants in these seminars, and interviews on the margins of the
seminars with intelligence professionals. While this cannot be considered
traditional social science research, which doesn’t work well with studies of
intelligence, on the margins of these seminars are ample opportunities to
learn and understand aspects of intelligence and fighting terrorism that
rarely become public. What is startling is how frequent and common are
mention of the same issues.
In the process of developing and delivering seminars on a wide variety of
topics, CCMR instructors have also contributed to the scholarly literature on
civil–military relations, including intelligence reform and countering
terrorism. The conceptualization developed in this work understands civil–
military relations (CMR) as a trinity, and intelligence is viewed by CCMR
as a subset of civil–military relations.
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CMR as a Concept
Once considered from this perspective, several reasons recommend a
CMR-based method to study intelligence, specifically when reviewing
a country’s intelligence community (IC). Accepting this approach requires a
consideration of what CMR means. To begin with, the three fundamental
issues of CMR are: (1) democratic civilian control; (2) effectiveness in
achieving roles and missions; and (3) efficiency. Democratic control means
simply that the military is under the control of the democratically elected
civilian leadership. Effectiveness means that the spectrum of roles and
missions, from war, to peacekeeping, to intelligence, to counterterrorism
are in fact implemented and achieved. And efficiency means that missions
are achieved at the least possible cost. This trinity of issues or parameters
of CMR applies to all aspects of CMR. Democratic civilian control can be
identified as existing or not. Effectiveness can also be determined, but the
data are more often available in older democracies than newer ones. True,
as the IC frequently notes, they are most effective when their work and
successes are not publicly known. Yet, fiascos such as 7 December 1941,
11 September 2001, 11 March 2004 (Madrid), 7 July 2005 (London), and
others provide incontrovertible proof that the IC was not operating
effectively. In between, partial but sufficient evidence indicates whether
and how well the IC is working, as pointed out by competing sectors of
the IC, the media, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In short,
effectiveness is an issue or parameter that can be identified and documented.
The same cannot be said of efficiency. How much is intelligence worth?
How efficient is it? Given the absence of transparency in intelligence as
both a process (including sources and methods), and with regard to
budgets, cost-benefit analysis cannot be performed in any realistic way. If
IC budgets do at some point become available in the public domain, it
may then be possible to assess efficiency as well (though, so far, when
budgets do become public, they typically do not provide enough data for
such analysis).
In short, the peculiar characteristics of intelligence limit researchers to
two of the three CMR issues or parameters. While not optimum, this is
still better than any competing known analytical alternative.
Much more recommends a CMR-based focus for the study of intelligence
beyond the trinity just mentioned. First, in most, if not all, of the newer
democracies, intelligence has been a monopoly of the military. This
ultimately leads to familiar issues in the civil–military relations literature
on transitions and the dismantling of the military prerogatives continuing
from authoritarian regimes.1 In at least one important case, that of
Romania, the contemporary IC is still militarized despite many proposals
to demilitarize it during the last fifteen years of democratic consolidation.
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In other countries, while great attention is given by the media and NGOs to
reforms leading to new, civilian organizations, military intelligence often
remains intact and commonly overlooked. Reforming military intelligence
remains a low priority for many governments because all attention is given
to the civilian organizations, which may or may not have the resources
and the ability to do their job. This lack of emphasis may be due to a lack
of knowledge of, and access to, military intelligence by the civilians who
are supposed to be exercising control.
Even in older and more institutionalized democracies, such as the U.S. and
France, the military still plays a predominant role in intelligence. France has
only marginally and recently moved away from complete military dominance
of its foreign intelligence organization, and, in the U.S., much foreign
intelligence was under the control of the military services until the end of
World War II. Even with the creation of new agencies under civilian
control, as the U.S. did in 1947 with the National Security Act, which
authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and more recently with
the establishment of the Office of Director of National Intelligence (DNI),
the military services still play a key role in intelligence. The congressional
debate in late 2004 on the implementation of the recommendations of the
National Commision on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the
9=11 Commission) and the establishment of the DNI showed how
important intelligence remains to the military, as evinced by the very high
level of political activity to ensure that the reforms would not interfere
with the military chain-of-command, and that the armed forces would
have timely access to the intelligence product for operations.2 Further, in
the U.S., some 80 percent of the funds for intelligence go to the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(NGA), and the intelligence organizations of each of the military services,
all military assets. Clearly, these agencies, as part of the Department of
Defense, are ultimately responsible to the civilian service secretaries and
the Secretary of Defense, but they have military functions, are often
headed by senior officers—either on active duty or retired—and ultimately
serve the military. Indeed, in early 2007, the directors of all of the main
intelligence organizations, including DNI and CIA, were retired or active
duty military. Perhaps the most important argument for a CMR approach
is that intelligence and the armed forces share the same ultimate goal: to
ensure national security.
INTELLIGENCE: MEANING, PURPOSE, AND FUNCTIONS
Dr. Mark M. Lowenthal, one of the most respected authors and
practitioners in the field of intelligence, defines it as three different, but
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interrelated, phenomena. First, intelligence is a process, as Lowenthal
explains: ‘‘Intelligence can be thought of as the means by which certain
types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and
disseminated; and the way in which certain types of covert action are
conceived and conducted.’’ Second, it is a product: ‘‘Intelligence can be
thought of as the product of these processes, that is, as the analyses and
intelligence operations themselves.’’ Third, it is the organization:
‘‘Intelligence can be thought of as the units that carry out its various
functions.’’3 The focus here is primarily on this third phenomenon—the
combination of organizations that make up a country’s IC.
With respect to its mission, intelligence serves two purposes: first and
foremost to inform policy, and second to support operations, be they
military, police or covert, with the ultimate goal of ensuring state
security. The general consensus is that these two missions result in four
functions, or roles: collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert
action. These roles are common to most intelligence systems, although
many authors and policymakers would prefer to exclude covert action.
How they are distributed between and among elements of the intelligence
organization differs from state to state, depending upon different threats
and resources.
These elements operate most effectively as part of a process in close
conjunction with one another. As Dr. Roy Godson, in the introduction to his
book, Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Intelligence and Policy, states:
It is difficult to imagine an effective system for collecting intelligence
without the analysis that provides effective guidance or ‘‘tasking’’ to
collectors. Counterintelligence is necessary to protect collectors from
becoming known, neutralized, and exploited by hostile intelligence
services. Similarly, a successful program of covert action must be
grounded in effective collection, analysis, and counterintelligence. All
of this is to say that the nature of intelligence is such that the several
elements of intelligence are parts of a single unified system, whose
success depends on all parts working effectively. In short, it must be a
‘‘full-service’’ intelligence system.4
THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE
Intelligence professionals are intimately familiar with the intelligence cycle
and where they fit into it. As depicted in Figure 1, the intelligence cycle
consists of five interconnected aspects: (1) establishing collection
requirements; (2) the collection itself; (3) processing and exploitation of
the collected materials; (4) analysis and production of the result, and
(5) dissemination of the product to the decisionmaker. Because the
intelligence cycle is continuous, continuous feedback must be provided.
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At this point the classic or traditional questions regarding the effectiveness
of intelligence, as process and organization, can be answered by looking to
the intelligence cycle
A. Requirements—Do the policymakers know what to ask for? The most serious
problem is normally that they don’t know what they don’t know, and are
therefore unable to define the requirement. Even if they do know what they
don’t know, can they clearly express what it is that they want to know?
Finally, do the policymakers know who to ask if the IC has more than
one agency? The most common basic problem regarding decisionmakers
and intelligence is the pervasive ignorance of the capabilities, and
limitations, of intelligence, exacerbated by the neglect of both what
intelligence professionals can do and the politicization of the organization
and the product. A very serious problem for those working in intelligence
is that they at times forget that intelligence, as a product, process, and
organization, does not have a value unto itself but only in terms of
informing policymakers so that they can in fact make the best possible
decisions.
B. Collection—Are there collection means available that will answer the
requirements? Or, are the agencies, and their collection means, committed
to the past, as to the ex-Soviet Union, and unable to anticipate emerging
threats such as international terrorism, as was the case with the U.S. in 2001?
How long will collection take to satisfy the policymakers’ requirements?
Intelligence must be timely; otherwise it is useless. Finally, how reliable are the
collection assets? In the case of the leadup to the war in Iraq, many observers
concluded that President George W. Bush relied too heavily on Dr. Ahmed
Chalabi head of the Iraqi National Congress, who provided seemingly biased
information.5
C. Analysis—Are analytic capabilities sufficient to handle raw information reports?
Or, as in the United States after the Cold War, and Brazil and many other
Figure 1. The Intelligence Cycle.
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countries at the end of their military or civilian dictatorships, have analysts been
let go so that neither a sufficient number of analysts nor adequately prepared
analysts assess newer threats? Are the analysts competent and qualified, or still
in training? Finally, does anyone use the analytic products? The issue of
consumption is, of course, crucial—as evidenced by the 2002–2003 lead-up to
the war in Iraq by the U.S. and Great Britain. The issue of consumption also
loomed large in the unfortunate response of the Spanish government of then–
Prime Minister Jose´ Maria Aznar to the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11
March 2004.6 On a more technical point, intelligence professionals and
decisionmakers may engage in ‘‘mirror imaging,’’ assuming that others, even
those with very different backgrounds and motivations, will act pretty much as
the analyses and decisionmakers believe they would. And, on a political level,
intelligence professionals have difficulty understanding that decisionmakers are
free to ignore or reject intelligence analyses, because they may have other, more
compelling priorities, despite the contents or findings of intelligence reports.
D. Dissemination—Is the distribution system effective? Do the products get to the
right users in a timely manner? This issue comes up time and time again with
decisionmakers at all levels who, in fact, want to use intelligence in their
planning: they complain that they don’t get the product they need when they
need it.
These four areas of tension or misunderstanding, focused on the classic
intelligence cycle, indicate the ongoing challenges inherent in intelligence
and its relationship to policy and strategy. They are normal and standard,
yet must be dealt with to function effectively.
INCREASED CHALLENGES FOR EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE
IN COUNTERING TERRORISM
The problems, tensions, and misunderstandings concerning intelligence
and its support to policymakers are aggravated in the context of fighting
terrorism.
Intelligence provides threat assessments to policymakers. Assessments
require information on both the capabilities and intentions of potential
enemies. In large measure, international terrorists are non–state actors; and
very few receive support from states (with Iran the most prominent
exception). To begin with, the professional intelligence analyst may not
know who the terrorists are, as was the case on 11 September in the U.S.,
11 March in Madrid, and 7 July in London, to cite the most famous
recent cases of successful terrorist attacks. Then, while intelligence
professionals may have extreme difficulty in determining the capabilities of
terrorists, assuming they have managed to identify them, terrorists are
most often so innovative and ruthless that anything can become a weapon,
making it almost impossible to determine intent. This is the case for a
454 THOMAS C. BRUNEAU


































number of reasons. First, the terrorists may not have even formed an
intention or may be changing it. Second, the terrorists may not have
undertaken any actions that could provide information on future plans for
attacks. And third, since the goal of terrorists is usually to cause as much
damage and attract as much attention as possible, with virtually no
limitations on behavior, everything becomes a target. This target-rich
environment severely restricts the ability of intelligence professionals to
determine terrorists’ intent.
The paradox of warning is a common problem in the relationship between
the intelligence professional and the policymaker. More generally, the logic in
proving the value (regarding effectiveness and efficiency) of intelligence
becomes a huge problem because when it is successful only those directly
involved in the process know anything about it. Proving a negative is all
but impossible; for instance, proving that a possible attack by terrorists
was thwarted by timely intell igence and proper response by the
policymaker. The situation is all the more complicated and difficult with
regard to terrorism when the terrorists are nonstate actors, the targets are
unlimited, and the preferred tactic these days is suicide bombing.
Therefore, almost any conceivable warning will have a large impact, for
instance, by severely raising threat levels, closing businesses and
government offices, and the like, all inconveniencing the public and raising
the costs of providing security. Then, if nothing happens, if the intelligence
and response were effective, the public and the policymaker are likely to
perceive the costs and not factor in that the attack that was thwarted. This
trap of logic has no solution.
With regard to intelligence failures in a non–terrorist context, a gradation or
scaling from the tactical to the operational to the strategic is possible.
Intelligence failure becomes more serious as it moves farther up the scale,
with intelligence failure at the strategic level, namely the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, having catastrophic consequences. Unfortunately, even with
failed intelligence at the tactical level, for instance, the 19 suicide bombers in
four commercial U.S. aircraft in 2001, can also have catastrophic
consequences. Thus, the levels of intelligence are mixed, and blurred, and
the requirements, and thus costs, for coordination are very high.
Any enemy—and certainly an enemy as motivated and ruthless as
modern international terrorists—seeks the weakest targets to attack with
the greatest impact. Unfortunately, the most effective response, at least in
the case of the U.S., is precisely where its Intelligence Community is
weakest. The U.S. has invested heavily in technology that was effective
against the USSR, with the result that the Cold War never turned hot,
except on the periphery, but is much less effective against dispersed non-
state actors. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is necessary, but requires a
long term and steady investment that does not well suit the American
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society or the bureaucratic approach to providing security. Consequently,
the question remains as to how many native speakers of Arabic, Urdu,
Farsi, Dari, and the like have been trained and are now embedded in
various countries and collecting information.
RESPONDING TO CHALLENGES
The current focus or challenge for policymakers is to combine democratic
civilian control with effectiveness in the roles or functions of the
intelligence community. And, in combating terrorism, the goal of
effectiveness is particularly challenging. Even in established democracies
such as the U.S., where there is no serious concern with the strength of
the democratic institutions, a tension, even a dilemma, is inherent
regarding intelligence. Democracy is based on an accountability of
government to the population that requires transparency. In order to be
effective, intelligence requires secrecy, and while not absolute, secrecy
must be maintained, at least at some level and in some sectors. In the
Latin American democracies that have transitioned from military
governments, including Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and also in
Colombia that is an older democracy but where the rule of law and
democratic accountability remain problematic, democratic civilian control
has so far trumped the goal of achieving effectiveness. In the U.S., even
though the main focus post–11 September has been to increase
effectiveness, control is still an issue. The concern with democratic
control has been increasing, mainly via congressional oversight. During
the twelve years of Republican Party control of the two houses of
Congress, overlapping with the seven years of the administration of
Republican President George W. Bush, congressional oversight barely
functioned. In sum, the motivations for intelligence reform are different
but mixed. Whereas in the U.S. it is overwhelmingly due to the perceived
need to increase effectiveness, and in the Latin American cases to assert
democratic control. In fact, some overlap exists: in the U.S., to truly
exercise legislative oversight, and in Latin America to become more
effective.7 The lesser, but still present, emphasis in the Latin American
cases on increasing effectiveness has at least something to do with the
U.S. attempt in the region to enlist support of the various countries for
the ‘‘global war on terrorism.’’ Consequently, the reforms taking place in
Latin America are overwhelmingly oriented toward asserting and
exercising democratic civilian control in the aftermonth of authoritarian
regimes in which intelligence was a perverted form of domestic state
security used by the agencies to protect the governments rather than the
nation or the people.8
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1. Establishing a Legal Basis for Intelligence
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have established the legal bases for reformed
and democratically controlled intelligence systems. In Argentina, this was
defined in Law 25.520 of 27 November 2001; in Brazil, with Law 9,883 of
7 December 1999; and in Chile, with Law 19974. In Argentina and Brazil
further elaborations and developments have attempted to better establish
the legal bases for intelligence.9 In Colombia, no legal basis for intelligence
exists as yet. The legislation proposed for that purpose in 2006 still had
not been passed in late 2007. As with much else in Colombia, the legal
basis for intelligence remains problematic.
2. Coordination Through a Civilian Head of Intelligence
In all four countries major efforts are underway to coordinate the intelligence
community through civilians appointed by the democratically elected
presidents. In Argentina, that component is the Secretary of Intelligence
who is responsible for the three components (civilian, police, and military)
of intelligence and responsible to the president. In Brazil, the job of the
Director of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) is to coordinate the
civilian, police, military, and other executive agencies involved in
intelligence system, or SISBIN. In Chile, the Director of the National
Intelligence Agency (ANI), communicates with the President via the
Minister of Interior. And in Colombia, while President Alvaro Uribe is
extremely active in directing and coordinating the IC, the Director of the
Administrative Department of Security (DAS), currently Andre´s Pena˜te, a
close colleague of the President, seems to be asserting his role.10
3. Reporting to the Presidency
In all the South American cases, an explicit effort is being made to increase
civilian control of the security agencies, and the IC in general, by direct
reporting to the Presidency. In Argentina, by the Secretary of Intelligence
to the President; in Brazil, through the Director of ABIN to the Secretariat
for Institutional Security (GIS) in the Presidency; in Chile, through the
direct reporting of the Director of the ANI to the President, bypassing the
Minister of Interior; and in Colombia, through reinforcing and making
more explicit the direct link between the Director of the (hopefully
reformed) DAS and the Presidency.
4. Legislative Oversight
Progress, with regard to legislative oversight, has been slower. In Argentina, in
2006, five years after the main law was passed, the regulatory law and staffing
plan to achieve real congressional oversight were enacted.11 In Brazil, the joint
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oversight committee still lacks its own legal basis, thereby severely limiting its
ability to exercise real oversight, and has only one staff member. In Chile, the
Congress is weak in general, including in this area. And, in Colombia, the
situation is even worse, with little or no congressional interest in oversight.
In sum, while oversight may formally exist in Brazil and Chile, it does not
function. Notably, though, while legislative oversight has been legally
established in the U.S. since the mid–1970s, and has been exercised
periodically since that time, its efforts have been reinforced only since the
congressional elections of November 2006, which restored the opposition
Democrats to power in the Senate and House of Representatives.
5. Educating the Intelligence Professional
Structural, or institutional, change—while difficult to legislate and even more
difficult to implement—is still easier and faster than professionalizing those
who will collect and analyze the information. This challenge of improving the
profession is critically important for both democratic civilian control and
effectiveness. For the former, as might be anticipated with any group working
in secret with access to generally unknown information (which translates
easily into power), ample opportunities for abusing that access are present.
This can undermine both the government’s accountability to the voters, by
interjecting an extraneous and uncontrolled element, and the legitimacy of the
government in the eyes of the population, due to agency scandals that often
become public. The importance of the need to professionalize the intelligence
personnel and the agencies themselves is recognized in all four South
American countries, although the responses are different. In the U.S., the
emphasis is on joint education and training, following in the model of the
Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization of Act of 1986. In Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile much emphasis and attention are given to the intelligence
academies. Some insights can be obtained by reviewing, for example, the
publications Revista de la Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia in Argentina, and
the Revista Brasileira de Inteligencia. In Chile, in addition to the academy
(which, however, does not publish a journal) the ANI also educates some of
its professionals in the civilian university system. And, in Colombia,
particular attention is given to the need to update educating and training in
the DAS Academy, and candidates for work in intelligence are now required
to have a university degree.12
EMPHASIZING DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL RATHER
THAN EFFECTIVENESS
In the U.S., the democratic institutions undoubtedly control the intelligence
agencies through a broad set of mechanisms.13 The emphasis in the
extensive intelligence reforms since 11 September 2001 has been mainly to
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increase effectiveness. In the three Latin American cases of relatively recent
authoritarian governments, the emphasis is much more clearly on asserting
democratic control than on increasing effectiveness. This is particularly clear
in Brazil and Chile, where restrictions have been placed on the size of ABIN
and ANI, as well as limitations on their access to classified information. In
Argentina, with both a large Jewish population and two terrorist attacks
against them in 1992 and 1994, the concern is on effectiveness, with fewer
restrictions on the IC’s sources and methods. And, in Colombia, where the
ongoing internal conflict continues to be punctuated by acts of terror, more
attention has been given to effectiveness rather than the institutionalization
of civilian control. Now, however, following a series of scandals, the
emphasis in Colombia is on a general reform to better structure civilian
control and increase effectiveness. As with all else in Colombia, however,
the challenge is to match rhetoric to reality.
STILL MORE REFORM NEEDED
Intelligence reform is today a prominent theme globally. Now recognized as a
requirement for democratic consolidation, the emphasis domestically and
with international organizations, such as the Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, is mainly on control. Since 11
September 2001, and subsequent attacks in Bali, Madrid, London, etc.,
governments have become concerned with effective intelligence agencies as
their first and main barrier against terrorist attacks. In the U.S., the
reforms are directed primarily toward increasing effectiveness. In the four
Latin American cases reviewed here, the emphasis remains primarily on
civilian control. Once these ICs are more fully institutionalized, and their
educational academies mature, effectiveness may increase as well. Several
issues still need to be addressed, however, principally from the reaction to
past events that will require changes in legislation before they will be better
able to respond to the current threats posed by international terrorists.
While the opinions expressed here are solely the author’s, he would like
to thank Paul Shemella, Manager of the CCMR Program in Combating
Terrorism in a Democracy, and Larry Cline, expert in intelligence
studies, for their insights that have undoubtedly influenced this article.
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